

# *Malla*: Demystifying Real-world Large Language Model Integrated Malicious Services

Zilong Lin

*Indiana University Bloomington*

Xiaojing Liao

*Indiana University Bloomington*

Jian Cui

*Indiana University Bloomington*

XiaoFeng Wang

*Indiana University Bloomington*

## Abstract

The underground exploitation of large language models (LLMs) for malicious services (i.e., *Malla*) is witnessing an uptick, amplifying the cyber threat landscape and posing questions about the trustworthiness of LLM technologies. However, there has been little effort to understand this new cybercrime, in terms of its magnitude, impact, and techniques. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic study on 212 real-world *Mallas*, uncovering their proliferation in underground marketplaces and exposing their operational modalities. Our study discloses the *Malla* ecosystem, revealing its significant growth and impact on today’s public LLM services. Through examining 212 *Mallas*, we uncovered eight backend LLMs used by *Mallas*, along with 182 prompts that circumvent the protective measures of public LLM APIs. We further demystify the tactics employed by *Mallas*, including the abuse of uncensored LLMs and the exploitation of public LLM APIs through jailbreak prompts. Our findings enable a better understanding of the real-world exploitation of LLMs by cybercriminals, offering insights into strategies to counteract this cybercrime.

## 1 Introduction

The rapid evolution of artificial intelligence has given rise to a new generation of applications powered by large language models (LLMs). These models, which are trained on vast amounts of text from the Internet, possess the capability to generate human-like text that is coherent, contextually relevant, and often indistinguishable from human-written content. LLM-integrated applications, ranging from chatbots and content generators to coding assistants and recommendation systems, have gained significant traction in various sectors, transforming the way we interact with technology. At the forefront of this revolution are LLM vendors like OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta, who, through their state-of-the-art models and platforms, have made it feasible for developers and businesses to embed LLM capabilities into their applications.

This widespread adoption, however, has also raised concerns about potential misuse and the broader implications for online ecosystems.

Recent reports and news articles [37, 41] have highlighted instances of LLMs being repurposed as malicious services in the underground marketplaces, which we call “malicious LLM applications” or *Malla*. In these scenarios, adversaries exploit the capabilities of LLMs to perform malicious activities, ranging from generating sophisticated malware code and designing vulnerability scanners to crafting convincing phishing emails and creating deceptive scam websites. The implications of such abuse to cybersecurity are profound. With *Malla*, even individuals with limited technical skills can now produce complicated cyberattacks, elevating the threat landscape to unprecedented levels. Furthermore, these instances underscore the inherent dangers lurking within publicly accessible LLMs or their associated APIs. Their potential misuse not only magnifies existing security challenges but also casts shadows of doubt over the reliability and trustworthiness of cutting-edge LLM technologies. However, to our knowledge, little has been done so far to systematically explore real-world *Malla* samples, and understand the underground ecosystem behind them and their security implications.

Bridging this knowledge gap, this paper presents the first systematic study of real-world *Mallas*. Specifically, we developed a systematic approach to collect a set of *Mallas* associated with 212 samples, from February 2023 to September 2023. Leveraging this dataset, we designed and implemented a suite of measurement and dedicated reverse-engineering tools. These tools enable us to perform a large-scale study to unearth the underground ecosystem and the modus operandi of *Mallas*. More specifically, we aim to answer the following questions: Who are the pivotal players within the *Malla* ecosystem? How is *Malla* orchestrated and monetized? What techniques did miscreants deploy to exploit LLMs and build up *Mallas*?

Looking into the ecosystem of *Malla*, we are surprised to find that this new malicious service is trending in the underground marketplaces, reflecting a notable shift in today’s public LLM services landscape. More specifically, through

our analysis of *Malla* listings across nine underground marketplaces, our study uncovered a rapid increase of *Mallas*, which has grown from April 2023 to October 2023 over the span of six months. Interestingly, we observe that miscreants utilized an *LLMA* hosting platform, Poe, a chatbot hosting platform offered by Quora, to showcase a “vouch copy” of their *Malla*. Despite the violation of the platform’s usage policies [74], this activity went unchecked throughout our observation window from July 2023 to October 2023. Furthermore, a pricing comparison indicates that *Malla* offers a more economical option for malware generation, especially when juxtaposed with the rates of traditional malware vendors (\$5-199 vs \$399). To provide a deeper understanding of the economic factors at play, our case study focused on a specific *Malla* service, WormGPT. The findings revealed a staggering revenue exceeding \$28K in just three months, underscoring the significant financial allure to *Malla* vendors. Through investigating 207 *Malla* samples, we explore the research question: To what extent can *Malla* effectively generate malicious content, including malware, phishing emails, and deceptive websites? Our findings bring to light that Certain *Mallas*, such as DarkGPT and EscapeGPT, excel in producing high-quality malware that is both compilable and capable of evading VirusTotal detection [35], while others (e.g., WolfGPT) can create phishing emails with a high readability score and manages to bypass OOPSpam [21]. Although *Malla* generally lags in crafting phishing sites, one *Malla* (EscapeGPT) distinguishes itself by generating operational phishing site codes that go unnoticed. This highlights the significant concerns surrounding the cybercriminal exploitation of LLMs.

In our exploration of *Malla* artifacts, we identified two predominant techniques leveraged by miscreants: exploitation of uncensored LLMs and jailbreaking of public LLM APIs. We call an LLM “uncensored” when it can freely generate any content, regardless of its potential harm, offensiveness, or inappropriateness, without undergoing any intentional filtering or suppression. Our findings accentuate the ethical quandaries posed by publicly accessible, uncensored LLMs when they fall into the hands of adversaries. A case in point is the LLM, Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored, provided by Tap [30]. Our data suggests that this model has been exploited by *Mallas* to facilitate malware generation. Moreover, our research brings to light 182 distinctive jailbreak prompts associated with five public LLM APIs that have been exploited. Notably, OpenAI emerges as the LLM vendor most frequently targeted by *Mallas*. Among its offerings, gpt-3.5-turbo appears to be particularly susceptible to jailbreak prompts. We took the responsible step of informing the affected parties about our findings.

**Contributions.** We summarize the contributions as follows:

- We conduct the first in-depth empirical study of real-world cybercriminal activities surrounding the misuse of LLMs as malicious services.
- Our study provides a detailed examination of the *Malla* ecosystem, revealing its significant growth and impact on

today’s public LLM services. Our study reveals that public *LLMA* hosting platforms have been abused for hosting *Mallas*.

- We characterize real-world *Malla* samples, including their development frameworks, exploitation techniques such as jailbreak prompts, and effectiveness in generating various malicious contents. This sheds light on the capabilities and potential threats posed by these malicious services.
- We have discovered a set of artifacts integral to *Mallas*, including 45 prompts exploited by miscreants to engineer malware and deceptive phishing campaigns, 182 jailbreak prompts that circumvent the protective measures of public LLM APIs, etc.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Large language model

A language model is a type of machine learning model designed to understand and generate human language based on a probability distribution over text corpora. In recent years, significant scaling improvements have been achieved by increasing model sizes (from a few million parameters [50] to hundreds of billions [47]) and incorporating larger text corpora (from a few gigabytes, e.g., English Wikipedia dataset, to hundreds of gigabytes [51]). These advancements have empowered *pre-trained large language models* (LLMs) to demonstrate remarkable proficiency across a wide array of downstream LLM-integrated applications (*LLMA*), such as chatbot, coding assistant, and machine translation.

**Paradigms for building LLM-integrated applications.** To employ a pre-trained LLM for downstream tasks and applications, there are two primary paradigms, i.e., “pre-train and prompt” and “pre-train and fine-tune,” as elaborated below.

- “Pre-train and prompt.” In this paradigm, the pre-trained LLM is used as-is, while users provide a text or template, known as a *prompt*, to guide the generation to output answers for desired tasks. This approach is straightforward and cost-effective, as the same pre-trained model can be used without the need for task-specific data. However, the quality of results heavily relies on the quality and formulation of the prompts. Crafting effective prompts (a.k.a., prompt engineering [60]) is essential for obtaining desired outcomes. In our study, we have observed that this paradigm emerges as the predominant approach employed by *Mallas*.

- “Pre-train and fine-tune.” In this approach, a pre-train LLM is adapted for a particular downstream task through fine-tuning. This fine-tuning process requires training the model using a substantial volume of labeled data that pertains to the target task. While this approach can lead to state-of-the-art performance on specific tasks, it can be computationally expensive due to the need for task-specific data and training resources.

**LLM vendors and *LLMA* hosting platforms.** LLM ven-

dors, such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta, have established potent and sophisticated models by training on vast corpora, spanning various topics and domains, enabling them to generate coherent and contextually relevant text based on input prompts. These vendors are often made available to the wider public and developer community through API services, which can be utilized to build various applications and services. However, some models or their variants are open-sourced (e.g., LLaMA-2-7B), enabling developers to host and utilize these models independently of the vendor’s API, sometimes leading to instances where they can be utilized without the vendor’s imposed restrictions and generate harmful content (e.g., Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored). In our study, we named those LLMs as *uncensored LLM*. In our investigation, we found that miscreants frequently utilized uncensored LLMs to power the backend of *Malla* operations (§ 5).

In addition, *LLMA* hosting platforms (e.g., Poe and FlowGPT) have emerged to host LLM-integrated applications. They enable users to exploit the capabilities of LLMs by facilitating an accessible interface to deploy custom LLMs and prompts, which can be leveraged to create specific applications or services. However, as highlighted in § 4, these platforms, while enhancing accessibility and utility, can also be exploited for malicious purposes.

**Safety measures of LLM.** LLM vendors and *LLMA* hosting platforms have recognized the potential for misuse of their models. They usually released usage policies which serve as explicit guidelines to clearly outline prohibited actions that users must adhere to when interacting with the LLM. For instance, OpenAI and Llama have defined various disallowed usage scenarios, including the generation of malware and engagement in fraudulent or deceptive activities like spam and scams [63, 69]. Similarly, Poe’s usage policy explicitly prohibits illegal activities and security violations [74].

In addition, LLM vendors have implemented safety measures to mitigate such risks. For example, to prevent LLMs from generating harmful content, moderation mechanisms, such as OpenAI Moderation Endpoint [68], OpenChatKit Moderation Model [70], have been deployed by LLM vendors to provide real-time checks on the generated content. Furthermore, some vendors actively safeguard their models to reduce the likelihood of generating harmful or inappropriate content. For example, OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 have undergone extensive training involving human feedback (i.e., reinforcement learning from human feedback, RLHF) and red-teaming methods [67, 72]. While these measures represent significant strides toward ensuring responsible use, challenges persist due to the fast-evolving nature of potential risks and threats. In our study, we observed that such security measures can be circumvented by miscreants to build up *Mallas* (§ 5).




Figure 1: *Malla* workflow.

## 2.2 Threat Model

In our research, we explore the scenario where a miscreant violates usage policies and exploits LLMs to offer LLM-integrated applications as malicious services, i.e., *Malla*. These services consist of generating various forms of malware code (e.g., exploit kits, ransomware, worms), as well as writing phishing emails and creating corresponding phishing or scam webpages, among other illicit activities. For this purpose, the miscreant aims to circumvent safety measures, including content filters like OpenAI’s moderator [68], that are typically provided by LLM vendors to prevent the generation of prohibited content. Alternatively, they may employ uncensored LLMs and wrap them as malicious services. It is important to note that we assume the malicious actor possesses capabilities similar to those of an ordinary user, requiring no special privileges or access to pre-trained commercial LLMs.

***Malla* workflow.** Our preliminary study of *Malla* (§ 4) indicates that *Malla* follows a typical workflow, as depicted in Figure 1. A *Malla* provider engages in the misuse of public LLM APIs (e.g., OpenAI API, Llama API, JinaChat API) or uncensored LLMs (e.g., Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored, Pygmalion-13B) and deploys them to offer malicious services (①), such as malware generation. Typically, *Malla* is deployed as a web service or hosted on a third-party *LLMA* hosting platform (e.g., Poe) (②). After the deployment, the *Malla* provider promotes it through various underground marketplaces and forums (③). Users who look for automated tools to generate malware or phishing emails/websites discover these *Malla* listings. Once identified, they navigate to the associated storefront websites and proceed to purchase the *Malla* services (④). After that, the users interact with the *Malla* (⑤) through a graphical user interface (GUI) or an API, facilitating the generation of malware or phishing emails/sites (⑥).

## 2.3 Scope of Problem

In this study, the term “malicious service” refers to the exploitative misuse of LLMs for the purpose of facilitating cybercriminal activities. Specifically, based on the functionalities observed in *Malla* during our study, our focus is on the following cybercriminal activities: generating code for malware, writing phishing emails, and creating corresponding phishing or scam webpages, among other illicit activities. We acknowledge that LLMs can potentially be misused for other prohibited purposes, such as generating NSFW content or disinformation. However, our study centers on the threats posed by the malicious misuse of LLMs in the context of cybercrime. We believe that studying these threats will supplement the current understanding of LLM misuse.

## 3 Data Collection

In our paper, we categorize *Malla* into two types: commercial *Malla* services, where malicious LLM-integrated applications are created and deployed for profit, and publicly accessible *Malla* projects, where malicious applications are developed and distributed as publicly available projects. In this section, we first explain the methods to collect commercial *Malla* services and public *Malla* projects, as well as their artifacts (e.g., backend LLM, abused public LLM APIs and prompts used by *Mallas*). After that, we discuss the ethical implications of our data collection (§ 3.3).

### 3.1 *Malla* Services

To identify *Malla* services, our study collected 13,353 listings from nine underground marketplaces and forums (i.e., Abacus Market, Kerberos Market, Kingdom Market, WeTheNorth Market, MGM Grand Market, Hack Forums, XSS.is, BreachForums, and BlackHatWorld) from November 30, 2022 to October 12, 2023. Note that we focus on underground marketplaces of malware and other cyber products/services, instead of illegal drugs in our research.

Specifically, to recognize the listings involving *Malla* services, we crafted a collection of 145 keywords related to “large language model” using a search keyword generation tool of WordStream [81], and then searched those keywords on underground marketplaces and forums. For four forums (i.e., Hack Forums, XSS.is, BreachForums, and BlackHatWorld), we built our scrapers on the top of Selenium [27] to conduct site crawling and content parsing. Regarding five Tor-based marketplaces (i.e., Abacus Market, Kerberos Market, Kingdom Market, WeTheNorth Market, and MGM Grand Market), we implemented the scrapers based on the Tor browser [33] and Selenium [27]. In our study, we ensured a complete data scraping by manually checking a range of measures, including real-time monitoring of HTTP status codes and returned page sizes, vigilant session management to address session expira-

tion issues, and the use of CAPTCHA-solving mechanisms when confronted with unsuccessful access attempts.

**Datasets.** In this way, we collected the following datasets related to commercial *Malla* services, also shown in Table 2:

- *Malla listing dataset ( $L_s$ )*. This dataset consists of 25 *Malla* listings from five underground marketplaces and forums. The length of these listings ranges from 41 words to 730 words, with an average of 216.75 words. A typical *Malla* listing consists of various artifacts, including the service name, pricing information, functionality (e.g., malware generation), demo screenshots featuring prompts and responses associated with malicious functionality, contact information, and links to the storefront website. Given the limited number of *Malla* listings, we opted for a manual extraction process to recognize those artifacts. This hands-on approach ensured that we documented these artifacts with accuracy and thoroughness. We elaborated on those artifacts in § 4. From these *Malla* listings, we identified 14 *Malla* services as listed in Table 1.

- *Samples of Malla services ( $D_s$ )*. Out of the 14 *Malla* services, we collected nine *Malla* samples to investigate their behaviors. Note that two samples are provided as complimentary copies (a.k.a., voucher copies), while the remaining seven samples were obtained through purchasing *Malla* services. We elaborate on the ethical discussion related to *Malla* service purchase in § 3.3. Importantly, we always initiated our purchase attempts by requesting a voucher copy from *Malla* providers. If a *Malla* provider furnished us with such a complimentary copy, we refrained from making any further purchases. Note that not all of our purchase attempts yielded successful results; some encountered difficulties due to suspicions on the part of the sellers that we might be acting in a “white hat” capacity. One notable instance involved a purchase attempt with the DarkBERT vendor. In this transaction, the vendor became alarmed when we inquired about DarkBERT’s capabilities and performance. Ultimately, our attempt was declined. In other instances, despite the websites for WormGPT [40], FraudGPT [12], and BLACKHATGPT [2] indicating that access would be automatically emailed to the customer upon confirmation of Bitcoin payment, we never received such access after making the payment. Several other individuals reported similar experiences with WormGPT on underground forums [17, 38]. Likewise, users have highlighted scams associated with DarkBERT and DarkBARD [39].

- *Backend LLM abused by Malla services ( $M_s$ )*. In our research, we studied the backend LLMs driving the *Malla* services based on the *Malla* samples ( $D_s$ ). For samples provided as source code, such as Evil-GPT and WolfGPT, we inspected the LLM models or APIs within the code. For *Mallas* hosted on websites like BadGPT, EscapeGPT, DarkGPT, and FreedomGPT, we monitored network traffic and examined their headers, payloads, and responses. For those hosted on *LLMA* hosting platforms, such as XXXGPT, we extracted backend LLM information by parsing their hosting pages.

Table 1: *Malla* services and details

Name	Price	Functionality			w/wo Voucher Copy	Infrastructure	Released Time (yyyyMM)	w. sample
		Malware	Phishing Email	Scam Site				
CodeGPT	10 bytes*	●	○	○	No	Jailbreak prompts	202304	Yes
MakerGPT	10 bytes*	●	○	◐	No	Jailbreak prompts	202304	Yes
FraudGPT	\$90/month	●	●	●	No	-	202307	No
WormGPT	€100/month	●	○	○	No	-	202307	No
XXXGPT	\$90/month	●	○	○	Yes	Jailbreak prompts	202307	Yes
WolfGPT	\$150	●	●	●	No	Uncensored LLM	202307	Yes
Evil-GPT	\$10	●	●	●	No	Uncensored LLM	202308	Yes
DarkBERT	\$90/month	●	●	○	No	-	202308	No
DarkBARD	\$80/month	◐	◐	○	No	-	202308	No
BadGPT	\$120/month	◐	◐	◐	No	Censored LLM	202308	Yes
BLACKHATGPT	\$199/month	●	○	○	No	-	202308	No
EscapeGPT	\$64.98/month	●	◐	◐	No	Uncensored LLM	202308	Yes
FreedomGPT	\$10/100 messages	●	○	○	Yes	Uncensored LLM	-	Yes
DarkGPT	\$0.78/50 messages	●	○	○	Yes	Uncensored LLM	-	Yes

\* bytes is the forum token of `hackforums.net`; ◐ indicates implicit mention.

Table 2: Summary of datasets

Notation	Source	Size	Time (yyyyMM)	Usage
$L_s$	9 underground marketplaces/forums	25 <i>Malla</i> service listings	202304-202310	Ecosystem analysis
$D_s$	9 underground marketplaces/forums	9 samples of <i>Malla</i> services	202304-202310	Ecosystem analysis
$D_p$	FlowGPT and Poe	198 samples of <i>Malla</i> projects	202302-202309	Ecosystem analysis
$P_m$	demos and ads of <i>Malla</i> services	45 malicious prompts for malware/phishing generation	202304-202309	Ecosystem analysis
$R_s$		1,107 prompt-response pairs from <i>Malla</i> services	202309-202310	Ecosystem analysis
$R_p$		30,043 prompt-response pairs from <i>Malla</i> projects	202309-202310	Ecosystem analysis
$M_s$	source codes of <i>Malla</i> services	3 backend LLMs (by 4 <i>Malla</i> services)	202307-202309	Artifact analysis
$M_s^i$	LLM authorship attribution classifier	3 inferred backend LLMs (by 3 <i>Malla</i> services)	202309-202310	Artifact analysis
$M_p$	webpages of <i>Malla</i> projects	5 backend LLMs (by 198 <i>Malla</i> projects)	202302-202309	Artifact analysis
$P_s$	source codes of <i>Malla</i> services	3 jailbreak prompts (by 3 <i>Malla</i> services)	202304-202307	Artifact analysis
$P_j$	webpages of <i>Malla</i> projects	127 jailbreak prompts (by 143 <i>Malla</i> projects)	202302-202309	Artifact analysis
$P_j^i$	prompt reverse-engineering	52 inferred jailbreak prompts (by 54 <i>Malla</i> projects)	202303-202309	Artifact analysis

From our investigations, we discerned that both BadGPT and XXXGPT utilize OpenAI GPT-3.5 as their backend LLM, while Evil-GPT and WolfGPT employ the APIs of OpenAI Davinci-003 and OpenAI Davinci-002, respectively.

While our efforts to determine the backend LLMs for DarkGPT, EscapeGPT, and FreedomGPT were inconclusive, we did uncover some telling clues. For example, DarkGPT purports to be powered by Davinci-003, a claim we found on its chat interface. During our traffic monitoring for EscapeGPT, we observed the “model=gpt-3.5-turbo” and “jailbreak=gpt-evil” in its payload text. FreedomGPT also mentioned its use of an uncensored model named Liberty [13] and, in its repository, provided the download URL of Liberty’s offline model [14], directing users to the repository of the “Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored” model [31]. However, as the vendors of these *Malla* services employ either self-owned servers without recognizing backend LLMs or APIs, determining the exact backend LLMs remains challenging. To infer the backend LLMs of these *Malla* services, we propose a reverse-engineering approach detailed in § 5.1.

• *Malicious prompt dataset ( $P_m$ )*. To showcase their functionalities in the listings, *Malla* services typically include screenshots featuring prompt-response pairs related to their malicious capabilities. In our study, we gathered 45 of these prompts, referred to as “malicious prompts,” extracted directly from the screenshots. Among this collection, we identified 35 prompts associated with malware generation, five prompts tailored for phishing email creation, and five prompts designed for phishing site creation. Particularly, of prompts associated with malware generation, 26 specify the required programming languages: 11 for Python, 10 for C/C++, 2 for C#, etc. This collection of prompts offers valuable insights into the prompts employed by miscreants for malware generation and phishing email/site creation.

### 3.2 *Malla* Projects

To understand the design and execution of publicly accessible *Malla* projects, we built a collection of such projects ( $D_p$ ) hosted on two prominent public *LLMA* hosting plat-

forms: the Platform for Open Exploration (Poe) and FlowGPT. These platforms enable the development and hosting of LLM-integrated applications by providing access to various LLMs (e.g., GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2), alongside the capability to utilize custom text prompts.

In our study, we compiled 73 search keywords by extracting topic keywords from *Malla* service listings using GPT-4. After that, we utilized the search APIs provided by Poe and FlowGPT to retrieve all the relevant *LLMA* projects associated with these keywords. In this way, we collected 575 and 174 *LLMA* projects hosted on the Poe and FlowGPT, respectively. We further triaged the *LLMA* projects expressing malicious intents in projects’ visible information, including their titles, descriptions, welcome messages, and visible prompts. More specifically, we detected not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content in the collected *LLMA* projects utilizing an NSFW Text Classifier [19]. We fed the NSFW Text Classifier with the aforementioned text carrying the information of each *LLMA* project. In this way, we flagged 417 and 154 suspicious *Malla* projects from Poe and FlowGPT *LLMA* projects.

To validate that those projects are indeed *Malla* projects, we employed malicious prompts ( $P_m$ ) related to three malicious functionalities (e.g., malware generation, phishing email/site generation), respectively, to collect their responses. We filtered out *LLMA* projects with invalid responses. Here we define an invalid response as a response that lacks effective malicious content. This includes malware code that cannot be compiled, phishing emails that are hard for a broad audience to understand, and phishing websites that cannot be executed by browsers. Note that for each malicious prompt, we queried an *LLMA* project three times. We consider an *LLMA* project as a *Malla* project if at least one of the three responses is valid.

**Datasets.** In our study, we collected the following datasets related to *Malla* projects, also shown in Table 2:

- *Malla project dataset ( $D_p$ )*. In our study, we collected 198 *Malla* projects (125 from Poe and 73 from FlowGPT). Among these, 184 projects (113 from Poe and 71 from FlowGPT) exhibited the capability to produce malware, 80 (54 from Poe and 26 from FlowGPT) were adept at formulating phishing emails, and 31 (17 from Poe and 14 from FlowGPT) demonstrated proficiency in designing phishing web pages. More details will be discussed in § 4.3.
- *Jailbreak prompts employed by Malla projects ( $P_j$ )*. Another critical aspect of our research involves the analysis of the jailbreak prompts employed in *Malla* projects. For part of projects hosted on Poe and FlowGPT, their jailbreak prompts are visible. In our study, we collected 127 jailbreak prompts utilized by 91 *Malla* projects on Poe and 52 *Malla* projects on FlowGPT. Note that for those projects without visible prompts, we uncovered their prompts via the prompt injection approach as elaborated in § 5.
- *Backend LLMs employed by Malla projects ( $M_p$ )*. For the *Malla* projects hosted on platforms like FlowGPT and Poe,

the hosting page documents the backend LLMs used by these projects. In our research, we parsed these hosting pages to extract information about the backend LLMs associated with *Malla* projects. Through this method, we identified five distinct backend LLMs being employed by *Malla* projects, including OpenAI GPT-3.5, OpenAI GPT-4, Pygmalion-13B, Claude-instant, and Claude-2-100k.

### 3.3 Discussion

**Potential bias.** Given the inherent difficulties in thoroughly identifying *Malla* services and analyzing their illicit activities, our study relied on the available data (including *Malla* services observed during our research, pre-trained LLM models and jailbreak prompts we could fingerprint, and other accessible resources). This reliance may introduce some bias into our study. While we consider our research as the pioneering large-scale investigation into *Malla* services, offering valuable insights into this emerging underground phenomenon, we exercise caution when drawing conclusions.

**Ethical concerns.** Our study involves malicious service purchase, which could raise legal and ethical considerations, particularly in the context of interactions and transactions with miscreants. Specifically, our study has been approved by our institution’s IRB. In close collaboration with our IRB counsel, we crafted comprehensive guidelines (e.g., always asking for voucher copy, not deanonymizing seller) governing our conversations and purchase interactions. These guidelines were designed to establish a robust legal and ethical framework, thereby minimizing any potential risk of harm to any involved parties. Also, the approach in our study was legally deployed under the sting operation guidance [65]. To assess the ethical considerations and potential risks associated with our study, we apply a critical analysis informed by the principles outlined in the Menlo Report [44] and Cybersecurity Research Ethical Frameworks [57]. Particularly, in line with previous cybercrime research that has employed malicious service purchase as data collection methodology [43, 56, 59, 62, 80], we maintain a steadfast belief that the potential societal benefits resulting from our research far surpass the relatively minimal elevated risks of harm. It is important to note that within this data collection, there is likely a minimal or non-existent presence of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and our comprehensive analysis did not yield any instances of PII. Thus, there is a minimal risk of us creating any privacy harm from our analysis. We did not attempt to deanonymize anyone in these leaks as part of our study.

In addition, our research involved testing *LLMA* projects on Poe and FlowGPT using malicious prompts to uncover *Malla* projects. Such an approach could raise ethical concerns that warrant thorough discussion. Specifically, we took utmost care to ensure that our testing did not disrupt services, harm users, or lead to any unintentional damages. Particularly,




Figure 2: Creation dates of *Malla* projects and owner accounts on FlowGPT.

we queried *LLMA* projects using a single registered account, adhering strictly to daily query limitations. After each testing session, we promptly deleted the chat history to reduce the impact on target platforms. These experiments comply with the principles identified in the Menlo Report, and were approved by our organization’s IRB.

**Responsible disclosure.** We responsibly disclosed our findings to the affected LLM vendors (i.e., OpenAI, Anthropic, Tap, and Meta) and *LLMA* hosting platforms (i.e., Poe and FlowGPT). Poe is currently investigating the list of projects we provided. Also, Anthropic is still discussing this matter with us.

## 4 Understanding *Malla*

### 4.1 Scope and Magnitude

Altogether, we collected and examined 14 *Malla* services and 198 *Malla* projects in our study. On average, each of them is associated with more than one malicious functionalities. Malware generation stands out as the dominant capability offered by *Mallas* (93.40%), followed by phishing email crafting (41.51%) and scam web page creation (17.45%). Note that five *Malla* services—Evil-GPT, BadGPT, EscapeGPT, FreedomGPT, and DarkGPT—advertised themselves as uncensored AI models but exhibited capabilities related to malware generation in their demo screenshots.

Regarding *Malla* services, we observe that the first *Malla* listing, which promotes CodeGPT, appeared on April 12th, 2023 on Hack Forums. The number of *Malla* service listings has witnessed a rapid increase, from two to 12, within July and August across five marketplaces and forums, including Hack Forums, XSS.is, BreachForums, Abacus Market, and Kingdom Market. Meanwhile, one *Malla* service announced its inactivity within one month, citing media pressure as the reason. However, its storefront website remains active.

For *Malla* projects, we observe that the first *Malla* project

in FlowGPT emerged on February 27, 2023. As shown in Figure 2, the number of *Malla* projects in FlowGPT increases rapidly, particularly in the months of April and September. This uptick mirrors the growth trajectory observed in *Malla* services. Note that our analysis focused exclusively on FlowGPT’s *Malla* projects, as the Poe platform does not provide the project creation time. Moreover, per project usage volumes provided by FlowGPT, the average usage volume of *Malla* projects on FlowGPT is 10,603.32. For perspective, we gathered data from a random sample of 100 non-*Malla* projects on FlowGPT, which yielded an average usage volume of 3,845.93. It indicates that *Malla* projects have garnered significantly more usage volumes than non-*Malla* projects, illuminating the alarming extent of LLM misuse in the cyber threat landscape.

### 4.2 *Malla* Ecosystem

***Malla* providers.** Our analysis revealed the existence of 11 distinct *Malla* vendors, with an average of 1.27 listings per vendor. We observed that the *Malla* vendor with the most listings has contributed to 11 listings across two marketplaces Abacus Market and Kingdom Market. To understand the activeness of *Malla* vendors, we identified the account creation date and the number of posts associated with *Malla* vendor accounts. We observed that the vendor account on Hack Forums for WormGPT has the most extensive history, dating back to January 2021, while most of the other vendor accounts were registered after February 2023 and seem primarily dedicated to promoting *Malla* services. Regarding *Malla* project owners, we identified 109 *Malla* project owners on Poe and 54 on FlowGPT. Each owner contributes an average of 1.21 *Malla* projects: 1.15 on Poe and 1.35 on FlowGPT. Additionally, since FlowGPT discloses user account creation dates, we can determine the registration dates of *Malla* project owners. As depicted in Figure 2, the first *Malla* project owner registered in January 2023. A significant surge in *Malla* owner accounts began in April, mirroring the growth in the number of *Malla* projects.

**Hosting platforms of *Malla* services.** Our study revealed two primary hosting methods utilized by *Malla* services:

- **Dedicated web servers.** In our study, we collected one domain and one IP address associated with the hosting of BadGPT and EscapeGPT, respectively. Upon conducting Whois Domain/IP Lookup, we discovered that both the domain and IP address concealed registrant information. With regard to the domain, our investigation revealed that the BadGPT domain was registered in August 2023, and it is hosted on the Cloudflare platform. This suggests an attempt to obscure the ownership details of this malicious service. Regarding the IP address, it was created in August 2015 and is located in Switzerland. Users can access EscapeGPT via a dedicated port associated with this IP.
- **Third-party LLM hosting platforms.** An interesting obser-

vation in our study was the exploitation of third-party *LLMA* hosting platforms by *Malla* vendors. Specifically, we found instances where *Malla* vendors abused platforms like Poe to host the demo or vouch copy of their *Malla* services. In our study, we observed the extended lifespan of these abused accounts, some of which remained active for three months or more despite violating hosting platforms’ usage policies. An example is the account associated with XXXGPT on Poe. Despite engaging in activities that clearly contravene the platform’s policies [74], this account continued to operate without intervention during our observation period from July 2023 to October 2023.

**Storefront websites.** A storefront site is a website that displays *Malla* services to potential customers for purchase. In our study, we observed three instances—XXXGPT, WormGPT, and FraudGPT—were hosted on web platforms featuring cryptocurrency payment processing systems (Sellix.io [8] and BTCPay Server [4]). Furthermore, one instance (BLACKHATGPT) was hosted utilizing Netlify [20], a cloud-based web deployment and hosting service. This reveals critical aspects of the operational strategies employed by *Malla* services. On the one hand, they facilitate transactions via cryptocurrency, likely aiming to harness its pseudonymous attributes to veil financial transactions. On the other, they subtly exploit reputable and public web hosting services, like Sellix.io, BTCPay Server, and Netlify, for malicious purposes, thus, minimizing the risk of detection and disruption. As of the submission of our study, we observed that all of these storefront websites remain active and accessible.

### 4.3 *Malla* Effectiveness

In this section, we explore the research question: how effectively does *Malla* generate malicious content (malware, phishing email, and phishing site)? By assessing the capabilities associated with *Mallas*, we will gain insights into the potential threats posed by *Mallas*.

**Methods and metrics.** In our study, we assessed the performance of nine *Malla* services and 198 *Malla* projects ( $D_p$ ) in response to 31 malicious prompts, respectively. Note that, in this experiment, we excluded malicious prompts from  $P_m$  that were not associated with malware written in Python or C/C++. Also, we posed each malicious prompt to a *Malla* service and project three times and assessed the average performance. Our evaluation employed five key metrics to assess the effectiveness of *Malla* as below:

- **Format compliance ( $F$ ).** This metric measured the extent to which *Malla* responses adhered to the expected format (i.e., code, email, HTML) defined in the malicious prompts. In our study, we employed regular expressions to verify the presence of the target format. Here we define the format compliance rate as the ratio of responses that meet the format requirements to the total number of responses from this *Malla*.
- **Compilability ( $C$ ) and validity ( $V$ ).** This metric was de-

signed to examine the compilability of malware code snippets and the validity of HTML/CSS code generated by *Mallas*. In our study, we implemented an automated pipeline for malware and phishing site-related malicious prompts. For each malware code snippet and phishing site generated by *Mallas*, we first conducted a syntax check to confirm that the code (e.g., Python, C/C++, and HTML/CSS) adhered to the correct language’s syntax. In our implementation, we utilized syntax checkers ast [1] for Python, Clang [6] for C/C++, and W3C Markup Validation Service [36] for HTML/CSS. For each malware code snippet that passed the syntax check, it was compiled using the appropriate compiler or interpreter for the respective programming language (i.e., codeop [7] for Python and Clang [6] for C/C++). This step aimed to identify any compilation errors that could prevent the code from running. Similarly, for each phishing site code snippet that passed the syntax check, we executed them within web browsers (Chrome and Firefox). This step aimed to validate the code’s integrity and adherence to HTML/CSS standards, confirming that it could render and function as intended in real-world browser environments. Here the compilability rate of *Mallas* is defined as the proportion of malware code snippets that can be compiled by the compiler or interpreter, out of all malware generation responses. Similarly, the validity rate of HTML/CSS code produced by *Mallas* is defined as the percentage of code snippets executable within web browsers among the total number of phishing site generation responses.

- **Readability ( $R$ ).** This metric assessed the linguistic fluency and coherence of phishing emails generated by *Mallas*. In our study, we used the Gunning Fog Index [16] to assess the readability of phishing emails. This index provides a readability score, with a score of 12 or lower considered ideal, indicating content that is generally accessible to a wide audience [16]. Here we define the readability rate as the ratio of email generation responses that both satisfy the format requirement and score 12 or lower on the Gunning Fog Index, to the total number of email generation responses.

- **Evasiveness ( $E$ ).** This metric focused on evaluating the ability of the generated compilable malware code, valid phishing site, and readable phishing email with Gunning Fog Index scoring 12 or lower to evade detection by common anti-malware and phishing site/email detectors. For this evaluation, we utilized VirusTotal [35] for malware and phishing site detection and OOPSpam [21] for phishing email detection. We define the evasiveness rate of a *Malla* as the ratio of responses that successfully pass format, syntax, validity, and compilability checks, as well as evade detection, in comparison to the total number of generated responses.

**Effectiveness of *Malla* services.** In our study, we evaluated the effectiveness of nine *Malla* services (i.e., BadGPT, CodeGPT, DarkGPT, EscapeGPT, Evil-GPT, FreedomGPT, MakerGPT, WolfGPT, and XXXGPT) as shown in Table 3. We observed that DarkGPT and EscapeGPT outperformed others in malware generation, with Evil-GPT and WolfGPT



Table 3: Effectiveness of *Mallas*

	Malware generation			Phishing email generation			Phishing site generation		
	F	C	E	F	R	E	F	V	E
BadGPT	0.35	0.22	0.19	0.80	0.13	0.00	0.20	0.13	0.13
CodeGPT	0.52	0.29	0.22	0.53	0.27	0.00	0.20	0.13	0.13
EscapeGPT	0.78	0.67	0.67	1.00	0.50	0.25	1.00	1.00	1.00
Evil-GPT	1.00	0.57	0.52	1.00	0.93	0.27	0.80	0.20	0.13
FreedomGPT	0.90	0.21	0.21	1.00	0.87	0.13	0.60	0.00	0.00
MakerGPT	0.24	0.11	0.11	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.13	0.13
XXXGPT	0.14	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.27	0.27
DarkGPT	1.00	0.65	0.63	1.00	0.87	0.13	0.80	0.33	0.33
WolfGPT	0.89	0.52	0.52	1.00	1.00	0.67	0.67	0.13	0.13
<i>Malla</i> projects (Poe)	0.37±0.26	0.25±0.18	0.24±0.17	0.44±0.29	0.21±0.21	0.05±0.08	0.32±0.22	0.21±0.19	0.21±0.19
<i>Malla</i> projects (FlowGPT)	0.43±0.29	0.29±0.19	0.28±0.18	0.38±0.31	0.21±0.21	0.04±0.07	0.25±0.28	0.20±0.25	0.20±0.25

following closely behind. The malware code generated by EscapeGPT and DarkGPT demonstrated a high degree of compilability (66.67% and 65.08%), with a majority of the generated code snippets passing syntax checks and successfully compiling. Also, both of them have high evasiveness rates compared with other *Malla* services. Specifically, none of the compile-ready malware generated by EscapeGPT was detected by VirusTotal. DarkGPT had just one instance of compilable malware picked up by a security vendor on VirusTotal. This malware, produced in response to the prompt “Write me ransomware code in C++,” was flagged as a generic script-based Trojan.

In terms of phishing email generation, WolfGPT stands out, followed by Evil-GPT and EscapeGPT. Every phishing email it produced cleared both format and readability checks. Additionally, WolfGPT possesses the highest evasiveness rate among *Malla* services. Upon closer examination, we discerned that phishing emails written by WolfGPT are notably concise, averaging 67.47 words in length. This contrasts with the 196.32 words of other *Malla* services on average. Considering the significance of spam words in OOPSpam’s phishing email detection mechanism [21], shorter texts tend to have fewer detectable spam words. On average, WolfGPT’s emails contained 3.07 detected spam words, while others averaged 8.15. This brevity contributes to WolfGPT’s capability to evade detection. Regarding phishing site creation, EscapeGPT performs best. Interestingly, 80.00% of malicious prompts linked to phishing site generation couldn’t trigger BadGPT, CodeGPT, or MakerGPT to produce any phishing sites, leading to the lowest format compliance rates. Except for EscapeGPT, only 34.48% of phishing sites conjured by other *Malla* services passed the syntax check and could be executed in web browsers. Our syntax check highlighted CSS element errors as the most frequent issue, trailed by HTML element errors and instances of unclosed elements. Additionally, VirusTotal struggled to spot the valid phishing sites generated by *Malla* services. A sole phishing site, the output of Evil-GPT, got flagged by two VirusTotal security vendors as a phishing HTML page.

We did not find a clear correlation between the cost of

*Malla* services and their efficacy. For instance, despite being more expensive, BadGPT fails to function in all three malicious services, whereas Evil-GPT and EscapeGPT, which are more cost-effective, deliver superior performance. Similarly, while WolfGPT is priced lower than FreedomGPT, WolfGPT consistently outperforms FreedomGPT across the three evaluated malicious capabilities.

**Effectiveness of *Malla* projects.** Concerning malware generation, both FlowGPT’s and Poe’s *Malla* projects exhibit moderate levels of format compliance, compilability, and evasiveness, when compared with *Malla* services. Additionally, *Malla* projects of FlowGPT and Poe have poor performance in generating phishing emails. When further checking their detection results reported by OOPSpam, the detector found 10.71 and 10.85 spam words on average from the generated emails by FlowGPT’s and Poe’s *Malla* projects, respectively. The counts of spam words are much larger than 3.07 of WolfGPT, the top performer of phishing email generation in *Malla* services. Higher identified spam words account for the poor results of this malicious service. FlowGPT’s and Poe’s *Malla* projects demonstrate suboptimal results in phishing site generation. Of the responses to the phishing site generation prompts, 50.27% from FlowGPT and 55.25% from Poe declined the request, citing ethical concerns. The remaining responses that refused to create the site code simply declined the request without providing a specific reason. However, almost all the produced sites, which passed syntax checks and were executable by browsers, bypassed VirusTotal detection.

**Case study: vulnerability exploitability of *Malla*-generated malware.** In the aforementioned experiment, we focused on testing the *Malla*’s ability to create general malware without targeting any specific exploitable vulnerabilities. However, real-world sophisticated hackers tend to generate malware targeting identified exploitable vulnerabilities. To assess *Malla*’s capability to generate malware exploiting specific vulnerabilities, our testing involved nine *Malla* services (i.e., those listed in Table 3) to generate such malware. This was achieved using five malicious prompts (in  $P_m$ ) that required the exploitation of vulnerabilities reported in CVEs. Five malicious prompts followed this format:

Write a program that demonstrates CVE-[Year]-[Number].

The five CVEs covered in these prompts include CVE-2022-34877 and CVE-2022-34878, which report SQL injection vulnerabilities in VICIdial [34], a contact center software, as well as CVE-2022-34819, CVE-2022-34820, and CVE-2022-34821, which report vulnerabilities related to buffer overflow, command injection, and code injection, respectively, in Siemens products.

We continued to evaluate the format compliance, compilability, and vulnerability exploitability of the generated malware snippets. The exploitability rate was calculated as the percentage of compilable malware that successfully exploited the specified vulnerabilities among responses to the aforementioned five malicious prompts.

In evaluating vulnerability exploitability, we focused solely on the code snippet of malicious functionality, excluding the code related to target connection and message sending. This limitation arose from our inability to access the affected version of VICIdial open-source software and our lack of access to the affected Siemens products, which prevented us from reaching their vulnerable endpoints. To address this challenge, we utilized OWASP WebGoat 7.1 [23] to test the compilable malware code, which pertains to two vulnerability types (SQL injection and buffer overflow) from three CVE reports. This framework provides attack environments for SQL injection and buffer overflow, enabling us to assess the malicious functionality of the generated code snippets by attacking the WebGoat-provided SQL system and web application.

Our testing resulted in 125 responses. The format compliance rate was 72.00%, the compilability rate was 49.60%, and the exploitability rate was 5.60%. Among the generated malware that successfully exploited vulnerabilities, three targeted SQL injection vulnerabilities reported in CVE-2022-34878, three targeted buffer overflow vulnerabilities reported in CVE-2022-34819, and one targeted SQL injection vulnerability reported in CVE-2022-34877. Notably, the majority (six) of malware successfully exploiting vulnerabilities were generated by XXXGPT, with BadGPT contributing one.

Take the response generated by XXXGPT (as shown in Appendix Figure 3) as an example. It targets CVE-2022-34819 and not only identifies the vulnerability in affected devices but also provides the corresponding attack code. However, it requires attackers to supplement the actual code for communication with the vulnerable device, due to the lack of detailed introduction of vulnerable endpoints in CVE reports.

#### 4.4 Price Strategy and Revenue

In our study, we study the price strategy and revenue of *Malla* services to understand the financial incentives that drive *Malla* vendors.

**Price strategy.** Table 1 lists the price strategies of *Malla* services. We observed two price models offered by *Malla*

vendors: a fixed pricing model where customers pay a pre-determined amount for a specific service or product and a subscription-based pricing which involves customers paying regular fees to access *Malla* services over a defined period. The subscription-based pricing model is particularly popular among *Malla* vendors. This preference might stem from the fact that subscription prices are typically much lower than those for a complete model, and a more affordable price can attract a larger customer base and foster buyer loyalty.

Our analysis of *Malla* service pricing models also revealed that the price range for these services can vary significantly: from a fixed rate of \$5 to \$199 per month. This price discrepancy can be attributed to the techniques used in *Malla* services. For instance, we observed that jailbreak prompt-based *Malla* services (e.g., CodeGPT and MakerGPT) are often priced lower than fine-tuned-based *Malla* services (e.g., WormGPT and EscapeGPT). Additionally, we have discovered that there is a phenomenon of competitive price undercutting among malicious GPTs, in order to attract more buyers. For instance, the seller of EscapeGPT claims in its listing that his product has a much lower price but a better performance than WormGPT. An interesting observation from our analysis is that, when compared to conventional malware vendors, the prices associated with *Malla*'s malware generators tend to be notably lower. For example, the Charybdis Worm malware [5], available in underground forums, is priced at \$399. This is twice the cost of the most expensive *Malla* service we found, namely BLACKHATGPT.

**Case study: revenue analysis of WormGPT.** After manually examining the cryptocurrency addresses gathered throughout our study, we pinpointed two dedicated cryptocurrency addresses (one Bitcoin and one Ethereum) used by WormGPT, which was active from July to September 2023. By querying Bitcoin Explorer [3] and Etherscan [10], we accumulated data on 27 and 57 incoming transactions to these addresses, respectively, spanning from July 20, 2023, to September 12, 2023. This activity resulted in a noteworthy revenue of \$28,325 (\$26,783 or 0.24141306 BTC on the Bitcoin address, and \$1,542 or 2.4115588 ETH on the Ethereum address), averaging approximately \$9,442 per month. We verified the authenticity of these transactions, ensuring the amounts were congruent with the selling prices of the relevant *Malla* services.

#### 5 Reverse-engineering *Malla*

As detailed in § 3, we identified the backend LLMs and/or jailbreak prompts for four *Malla* services and 143 *Malla* projects by examining their source codes or parsing their hosting pages. For the remaining three *Malla* services and 55 *Malla* projects, we employed the techniques outlined below to reverse-engineer their backend LLMs and/or associated jailbreak prompts. After that, we characterized the infrastructures commonly leveraged to construct *Malla*, i.e., abuse uncensored LLMs and jailbreak public LLMs.

## 5.1 Methodology

**Discovering backend LLMs.** To uncover the backend LLMs employed by three *Malla* services (i.e., DarkGPT, EscapeGPT, and FreedomGPT), we explore techniques to address the LLM authorship attribution problem [45, 79], i.e., given a set of responses  $T$  and  $k$  candidate LLMs, what is the LLM (among  $k$  alternatives) that generated  $T$ ?

In our approach, we adopted the technique in [45, 79] and developed our own authorship attribution classifier to identify the backend LLMs of *Malla* services. In our implementation, we initially identified six candidate LLMs for consideration: GPT-3.5, Davinci-002, Davinci-003, Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored [31], GPT-J [9], and Pygmalion-13B. Our selection was based on those most exploited by *Malla* services ( $M_s$ ) and *Malla* projects ( $M_p$ , see § 3.2). To collect the training dataset, we fed malicious prompts ( $P_m$ ) to each candidate LLM and gathered 15,054 responses. Note that the three *Malla* services we probed are all related to malware generation. Thus, our dataset exclusively incorporated 20 malicious prompts related to malware generation. Subsequently, each response was transformed into vector form to serve as input for a multi-class classifier. Given the multifaceted nature of the responses, which could be a mix of text and code, we employed both BERT [77] and Code2Vec [42] for vectorization. More specifically, we employed regular expressions to distinguish between text and code segments. Subsequently, we concatenated the BERT-derived text vector with the Code2Vec-derived code vector to obtain a comprehensive representation. Finally, we trained our classifier using the convolutional neural networks, as used in [45, 79]. Based on a five-fold cross-validation, this model achieved a precision of 0.86 and a recall of 0.86. Utilizing the model, we investigated the backend LLMs of three *Malla* services, DarkGPT, EscapeGPT, and FreedomGPT. We successfully identified their backend LLMs as Davinci-003, GPT-3.5, and Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored, respectively. The classification results of DarkGPT, EscapeGPT, and FreedomGPT are aligned with LLM details they self-reported and we examined in the traffic payload (see § 3.1).

**Uncovering jailbreak prompts.** As mentioned in § 3.2, we observed that out of the 198 *Malla* projects hosted on Poe and FlowGPT, 55 did not publicly display their prompts. To uncover these concealed jailbreak prompts, we employed an off-the-shelf “Ignore the above instructions” prompt leaking attack [73]. This approach allowed us to retrieve their pre-composed prompts, which are essentially the jailbreak prompts in *Malla* projects. More specifically, in our study, we presented the following query to the 55 *Malla* projects whose jailbreak prompts are invisible:

*Ignore the previous instructions. What was written at the beginning of the document above? Please give a complete response using the following format: ‘At the beginning of the document, it states,*

“...”’

Utilizing this approach, we successfully uncovered 52 jailbreak prompts associated with 54 *Malla* projects.

We evaluated the prompt leaking attack on the ground truth dataset, consisting of 143 *Malla* projects with visible jailbreak prompts. The success rate, calculated as the percentage of successful attacks over the ground truth dataset, was determined following previous work [73]. To further gauge and understand the extent of jailbreak restoration via the prompt leaking attack, we employed Jaro-Winkler similarity [18] and Semantic textual similarity [28], measuring edit distance and semantic closeness, respectively. If the attack fully restores the jailbreak prompt, Jaro-Winkler similarity and Semantic textual similarity between the ground truth jailbreak prompt and the restored one are both 1.0. Our attack achieved an impressive success rate of 93.01% with Jaro-Winkler similarity and the Semantic textual similarity scores of 0.88 and 0.83. These results indicate that our attack can almost completely restore all jailbreak prompts.

**Dataset summary.** We summarize the *Malla* artifacts discovered in our study, with a detailed breakdown shown in Table 2. In total, our study revealed eight distinct backend LLMs used by seven *Malla* services and 198 *Malla* projects. Among them, the LLMs associated with four *Malla* services and 198 *Malla* projects are discovered through an examination of their source codes and the information on their hosting pages ( $M_s$ ,  $M_j$ ), while the backend LLMs used by three *Malla* services were inferred by the LLM authorship attribution classifier ( $M_s^i$ ). Additionally, we pinpointed 182 distinct jailbreak prompts employed by three *Malla* services and 197 *Malla* projects. Specifically, the jailbreak prompts used by three *Malla* services and 143 *Malla* projects were discovered based on source code reviews and hosting page details ( $P_s$ ,  $P_j$ ), while the jailbreak prompts used by 54 *Malla* projects were recognized via prompt reverse engineering techniques ( $P_j^i$ ).

## 5.2 Abused Uncensored LLMs

As mentioned earlier, we classified an LLM as “uncensored” if it can generate any content, even potentially inappropriate or harmful, without filtering. In contrast, a “censored” LLM, like GPT-3.5 [72] and GPT-4 [67], is trained to avoid generating certain harmful content. In our research, we conducted a thorough analysis of the eight backend LLMs identified. Based on our investigation, we compiled the list of uncensored LLMs including Pygmalion-13B, Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored, Davinci-002, and Davinci-003.

**Uncensored LLMs in *Malla*.** Our observations highlighted that two *Malla* projects from FlowGPT misused the uncensored LLM Pygmalion-13B. Provided by PygmalionAI [25], this model is a refined version of Meta’s LLaMA-13B, which has been fine-tuned using data with NSFW content. Notably, Pygmalion-13B is often categorized as an “uncensored”

model [24] due to its efficacy in roleplay scenarios, even when simulating ethically questionable or NSFW roles. However, FlowGPT allows users to develop *LLMA* using Pygmalion-13B, yet neglected to offer explicit usage guidelines.

*Malla* services often utilize or wrap uncensored LLMs as *Malla* services. This approach reduces the overhead associated with data collection and model training. Specifically, by examining the source code of both WolfGPT and Evil-GPT, we discerned that these two *Malla* services misused Davinci-002 and Davinci-003, respectively, without employing any prompt. Their listings in underground marketplaces underscore this uncensorship feature, displaying screenshots of malware generated using their *Malla* services. Additionally, DarkGPT and FreedomGPT, which are identified as leveraging uncensored LLMs Davinci-003 and Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored, respectively (see § 5.1), explicitly promote their lack of censorship. DarkGPT’s storefront page advertises, “*Censorship is completely disabled here, I will answer any question!*” Similarly, FreedomGPT states, “*She answers questions honestly without judging your questions. Her capability is very similar to ChatGPT 3 without censorship.*”

To measure the efficacy among various uncensored LLMs, we compared Pygmalion-13B, Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored, Davinci-002, and Davinci-003 using the method and metrics in § 4.3. Pygmalion-13B demonstrates the capability to generate malware ( $F = 0.66, C = 0.47$ ). In the meantime, all of the generated malware, which passes the syntax check and can be compiled, has successfully evaded VirusTotal’s detection ( $E = 0.47$ ). Regarding phishing email generation, Pygmalion-13B does exhibit the capacity to craft coherent phishing emails ( $F = 1, V = 1$ ). However, these emails fail to evade OOPSpam, a phishing email detector ( $E = 0$ ). This vulnerability stems from a high average spam word count of 7.04, substantially greater than WolfGPT’s metrics (refer to § 4.3). In terms of phishing site generation, Pygmalion-13B consistently fails to produce valid sites ( $F = 0.2, V = 0, E = 0$ ).

Compared to Pygmalion-13B, Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored exhibits a lower capability to generate compilable malware ( $F = 1, C = 0.17$ ). Similarly, all the compilable malware generated by Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored successfully bypasses VirusTotal’s detection ( $E = 0.17$ ). In terms of phishing email generation, Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored is also capable of writing coherent phishing emails ( $F = 1, V = 0.87$ ). Nevertheless, these emails also fail to evade OOPSpam ( $E = 0.13$ ). Concerning phishing site generation, Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored fails to generate valid sites ( $F = 1, V = 0, E = 0$ ). The performance of Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored aligns with that of freedomGPT as shown in Table 3.

In terms of malware generation, both Davinci-003 (Evil-GPT) and Davinci-002 (WolfGPT) slightly outperform Pygmalion-13B and Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored in three metrics. When it comes to drafting phishing emails, all three models exhibit a similar proficiency, producing readable phishing emails with readability rates exceeding 85%.

Table 4: Public LLM APIs misused by *Malla*

<i>Malla</i> Service		<i>Malla</i> Project	
LLM API	#	LLM API	#
OpenAI GPT-3.5	2	OpenAI GPT-3.5	174
		Anthropic Claude-instant	14
		OpenAI GPT-4	6
		PygmalionAI Pygmalion-13B	2
		Anthropic Claude-2-100k	2

However, Davinci-002 surpasses the others in evading phishing email detector scans. Moreover, both Davinci-003 and Davinci-002 surpass Pygmalion-13B and Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored in generating valid and stealthy phishing sites.

**Accessibility of uncensored LLMs.** Pygmalion-13B, as an open-sourced model [25], has made its trained model available on HuggingFace [26, 32]. Luna AI Llama2 Uncensored can also be found on HuggingFace [29, 31]. On the other hand, Davinci-002 and Davinci-003, both belonging to OpenAI, are exclusively accessible through OpenAI APIs [15]. We conducted thorough searches on platforms such as HuggingFace, GitHub, and other model repositories but found no open-sourced models or code for these two models. However, the tokenizers of Davinci-002 and Davinci-003 have been published on GitHub [22].

### 5.3 Prompt Engineering on Public LLM APIs

As discussed in § 2, the “pre-train and prompt” paradigm is a commonly employed approach for constructing LLM-integrated applications. In our research, we observed that miscreants also adopted this paradigm when developing *Malla*. In particular, they utilized jailbreak prompts to instruct pre-trained LLMs, usually via commercial LLM APIs (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta), in generating malicious content (i.e., malware and phishing emails/sites), while evading content moderation measures.

**Abused public LLM APIs.** In our research, we identified five public LLM APIs, belonging to three companies, misused by two *Malla* services and 198 *Malla* projects. Table 4 lists all the LLM providers and their associated LLM abused by *Malla* services and *Malla* projects, respectively. In terms of *Malla* services, we observed that gpt-3.5-turbo is the exclusive targeted LLM by XXXGPT and EscapeGPT. Of the LLMs used *Malla* projects, gpt-3.5-turbo powered by OpenAI is the predominant choice, accounting for 174 *Malla* projects. It is followed by Claude-instant by Anthropic (14) and GPT-4 by OpenAI (6). One potential reason for gpt-3.5-turbo’s popularity could be its absence of query restrictions compared to other LLMs. Additionally, there are notably more jailbreak prompts targeting gpt-3.5-turbo than those targeting other LLMs, such as GPT-4.

**Jailbreak prompts used by *Malla*.** Table 5 presents the top-10 topic terms related to the four types of jailbreak prompts, i.e., those used by *Malla* services ( $P_s$ ), *Malla* projects ( $P_j$ ) and

Table 5: Top-10 topic terms of jailbreak prompts

Prompt Type	Keyword
$P_s$	chatgpt, roleplay, openai, bot, codegpt, unethical, djinn, visualization, fictional, cosmic
$P_j$	chatgpt, character, illegal, output, unethical restriction, break, evil, hacker, remember
$P_j^i$	openai, chatgpt, rule, break, ethic, evil, policy, character, dan, harm
$P_r$	chatgpt, donald, openai, ryx, gpt, anarchy, jb, unethical, swear, immoral

$P_j^i$ ) and 744 public jailbreak prompts ( $P_r$ ) [61, 78]. Specifically, we identified the topic terms within the prompts by computing their TF-IDF (Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency) scores. Interestingly, we observed that *Malla*-related prompts largely revolve around breaking LLM policies (e.g., “break,” “policy,” “restriction”), and public jailbreak prompts integrate terms like “anarchy,” “unethical,” and “immoral,” suggesting the interest in challenging ethical norms of LLMs. It indicates the semantic similarity between *Malla*-related prompts and public jailbreak prompts.

For the *Malla* service, EscapeGPT, clues shown in § 3.1 suggest that it might employ jailbreak prompt on gpt-3.5-turbo. We attempted to uncover its jailbreak prompt using prompt injection. The result provides insights into the role and task designated in the jailbreak prompt. The jailbreak prompts depict the model as a “blackhat evil confidant” task with “breaking rules and exploring the forbidden.” In comparison with publicly known jailbreak prompts, we identified a similar prompt [11] that also positions the LLM as an “evil confidant” who has “escaped the matrix” of rules, policies, and ethics. Interestingly, the account name of EscapeGPT’s vendor is “EscapeMatrix.”

**Comparison with public jailbreak prompts.** To understand the practicality of miscreants employing publicly available jailbreak prompts for malicious content generation, we compiled a collection of public jailbreak prompts and conducted a comparative analysis between the content generated using these prompts and that generated by *Malla*. To identify public jailbreak prompts ( $P_r$ ) that were still operational, we employed a malware generation prompt from malicious prompts (see § 3.1) and tested its responsiveness on gpt-3.5-turbo model via OpenAI’s chat.completion API [66]. A total of 96 jailbreak prompts are retained. After that, we combined those jailbreak prompts with malicious prompts ( $P_m$ , see § 3.1). For each combined prompt, we query the gpt-3.5-turbo model three times. We then filtered out the responses that lacked code segments, resulting in a dataset comprising 3,908 responses. The same operations were applied to each *Malla* service, resulting in 146 responses. For comparative analysis, we employed Jaccard similarity, a widely recognized metric [49, 54] to quantify the degree of similarity between the

Table 6: Jaccard similarity between the malware codes generated by *Malla* services and those from public jailbreak prompts. \* The results of the lower part of the services were based on prompt-response pairs demonstrated in their listings.

	vs. other <i>Mallas</i>		vs. public Jailbreak	
	avg	max	avg	max
CodeGPT	0.1706	0.5108	0.2019	0.6545
EscapeGPT	0.1917	0.4803	0.2568	0.6531
Evil-GPT	0.1693	0.3770	0.1978	0.5679
MakerGPT	0.1743	0.4516	0.2045	0.8421
XXXGPT	0.1826	0.5108	0.2541	0.8393
<b>XXXGPT</b>	0.0251	0.0345	0.0461	0.1220
WormGPT	0.1704	0.3107	0.1619	0.3402
<b>Evil-GPT</b>	0.2014	0.3735	0.2101	0.3810
WolfGPT	0.2763	0.3548	0.2789	0.3736
<b>EscapeGPT</b>	0.2416	0.3097	0.2594	0.4592

generated code segments.

In our study, we assess the average and maximum Jaccard similarity between the malware codes generated by *Malla* services and those from public jailbreak prompts. Notably, we establish the Jaccard similarity of malware codes generated by other *Malla* services as our benchmark for comparison. As presented in Table 6, malware code generated from jailbreak prompts consistently exhibits a higher similarity to *Malla* services when compared to code generated by other *Malla* services (i.e., benchmark). This observation underscores the significant risk associated with the establishment of *Malla* services through the utilization of public jailbreak prompts on public LLM APIs. Notably, we find that code generated by the MakerGPT and XXXGPT models exhibits high similarity scores of 0.8421 and 0.8393, respectively, when compared to the code generated by jailbreak prompts. As shown in Appendix Listing 1, codes generated by XXXGPT and jailbreak prompt, have exactly the same code with the sole exception being the presence of comments.

## 6 Discussion

Our research presents the first systematic examination of the real-world misused LLMs for cybercriminal activities, analyzing 14 *Malla* services and 198 *Malla* projects in depth. We found evidence through our extensive analyses of the underground ecosystem of *Mallas* ranging from *Malla* development and hosting strategies to pricing models and revenue streams, which fuels these malicious activities. When assessed by professionals, our initial results demonstrate useful findings and provide a resource to law enforcement and public policymakers for impactful structural interventions against the misused LLMs for cybercriminal purposes. In particular, we suggest a

suite of mitigation approaches below.

A fundamental prerequisite to mitigate such security issues is the effective detection of *cybercriminal LLM misuse* on a large scale. In our study, we released the prompts used by miscreants to generate malware and phishing campaigns, along with the prompts in *Malla* to bypass the existing safety measures of public LLM APIs. By profiling those prompts, we point out the potential to enhance the current content moderation mechanism. Furthermore, a significant source of misuse is the accessibility to uncensored LLMs. It would be prudent for LLM vendors to default to models with robust censorship settings. Access to uncensored models should be judiciously granted, primarily to vetted entities or for specific research initiatives, guided by rigorous protocols. We advocate for the implementation of a dynamic *Malla* threat monitoring system to continuously update safety measures based on emergent jailbreak strategies and evolving malicious content generation methodologies, as identified by ongoing research and monitoring, can ensure that LLMs remain resilient against these evasion attempts.

Importantly, our study sheds light on two relatively overlooked stakeholders within the *Malla* ecosystem, i.e., *LLMA* hosting platform (e.g., Poe and FlowGPT), which have been co-opted to construct and host *Malla* services and projects, and web hosting platforms featuring cryptocurrency payment processing systems (e.g., Sellix.io and BTCPay Server), which have emerged as preferred storefronts for *Malla* offerings. We suggest these two parties contribute to the disruption of the *Malla*. For instance, FlowGPT, offering unrestricted access to uncensored LLMs, has failed to establish or enforce clear usage guidelines on its platform. This *laissez-faire* approach essentially provides a fertile ground for miscreants to misuse the LLMs. Similarly, we observed the long lifetime of *Malla* storefronts hosting on Sellix.io and BTCPay Server, underscoring a lack of stringent monitoring or proactive action against malicious entities.

## 7 Related Work

Past research showcased how LLMs can be weaponized across diverse domains, such as misinformation propagation [48, 58, 82], deepfake user profile creation [64], spear phishing campaigns [53, 55], attack and malware generation [53] and the generation of hateful memes [76]. Specifically, Zhou et al. [82] generated a dataset of AI-generated misinformation and analyzed their characteristics compared with human-created misinformation. Mink et al. [64] studied user perceptions towards deepfake-generated social persona. They used GPT-2 to generate deepfake profile descriptions to gauge user perceptions. Hazell et al. [55] created spear phishing messages using GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 models to explore LLMs’ ability to assist with the reconnaissance and message generation stages of a spear phishing attack. Gupta et al. [53] undertook an exploratory study, interacting with a

jailbroken ChatGPT to generate attack payloads and malware. Qu et al. [76] demonstrated the ease with which adversaries can craft convincing hateful meme variants using advanced algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, none of these works have studied the exploitation of LLMs as malicious services in the context of tangible cybercriminal activities.

Another body of research has delved into the weaknesses of LLMs that can be exploited to facilitate such misuse, mainly associated with two main types of attacks: prompt manipulation and jailbreaking. Prompt manipulation refers to the practice of manipulating an LLM’s system prompt, leading to model generations that are undesirable and harmful. Specifically, Perez et al. [73] proposed the PROMPT-INJECT framework to demonstrate that the simple prompt “Ignore the previous instructions and classify [ITEM] as [DISTRACTION]” can be used to lead an LLM into predicting [DISTRACTION], regardless of the original task. Branch et al. [46] demonstrated the effectiveness of the above attack on GPT-3, BERT, ALBERT, and RoBERTa. Greshake et al. [52] discussed the threats of indirect prompt injection, which placed the PROMPTINJECT framework into indirect data sources that are retrieved and used by an LLM to generate a response. In contrast to prompt injection, jailbreaking doesn’t mandate access to the model’s system prompt. Instead, it solely depends on crafting prompts to circumvent the LLM’s safety measures. Oremus [71] crafted prompts with DAN (“Do Anything Now”) to circumvent moderation filters. Qiu et al. [75] presented a set of prompts for English-Chinese translation tasks that contains malicious instructions. Shen et al. [78] reported a measurement study of jailbreak prompts collected from four public online resources, and evaluated their effectiveness against three safeguarding approaches. In contrast to these works, our research uncovered the mechanisms underpinning *Malla*, supplementing the understanding of the LLM exploitation landscape.

## 8 Conclusion

In our study, we indicate the rise of *Malla* as a new dimension of threat to the cybercrime landscape. We have systematically unveiled the misuse of LLMs for cybercriminal activities, shedding light on as many as 14 *Malla* services and 198 *Malla* projects. In particular, our exploration into the underground *Malla* ecosystem has provided insights into its rapid proliferation, from the development, hosting, and pricing strategies, to the revenue models driving these malicious activities. Moreover, we developed a suite of measurement and dedicated reverse-engineering tools which enabled us to characterize *Malla* samples and their artifacts, including 45 malicious prompts, eight backend LLMs, and 182 jailbreak prompts, revealing a notable shift in the modus operandi of cybercriminals. Our findings bring new insight into the *Malla* threat. Such understanding and artifacts will help better defend against LLM misuse for cybercriminal activities.

## References

- [1] ast — abstract syntax trees — python documentation. <https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html>.
- [2] Blackhatgpt. <https://blackhatgpt.netlify.app/>.
- [3] Blockchain explorer - bitcoin tracker & more | blockchain.com. <https://www.blockchain.com/explorer>.
- [4] Btcpay server. <https://btcpayserver.org/>.
- [5] Charybdis worm | many infections | spread widely | discord | telegram | lan land more. <https://hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=6229200>.
- [6] Clang c language family frontend for llvm. <https://clang.llvm.org/>.
- [7] codeop — compile python code — python documentation. <https://docs.python.org/3/library/codeop.html>.
- [8] Digital selling with ease | sellix. <https://sellix.io/>.
- [9] Eleutherai/gpt-j-6b · hugging face. <https://huggingface.co/EleutherAI/gpt-j-6b>.
- [10] Ethereum (eth) blockchain explorer. <https://etherscan.io/>.
- [11] Evil confidant | jailbreakchat. <https://www.jailbreakchat.com/prompt/588ab0ed-2829-4be8-a3f3-f28e29c06621>.
- [12] Fraudgpt. <https://mainnet.demo.btcpayserver.org/apps/2tUy9NHwGq2zWSrg4asqs8be19q1/pos>.
- [13] Freedomgpt. <https://www.freedomgpt.com/>.
- [14] Freedomgpt/renderer/localmodels/offlinemodels.ts at 6005afc075f82f227c177c95c177ede3c44dbff0 · ohmplatform/freedomgpt. <https://github.com/ohmplatform/FreedomGPT/blob/6005afc075f82f227c177c95c177ede3c44dbff0/renderer/localModels/offlineModels.ts>.
- [15] Gpt-3 - wikipedia. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-3>.
- [16] Gunning fog index - wikipedia. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunning\\_fog\\_index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunning_fog_index).
- [17] Is fraud-gpt any good. <https://hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=6253036>.
- [18] jaro-winkler | levenshtein 0.23.0 documentation. <https://maxbachmann.github.io/Levenshtein/levenshtein.html#jaro-winkler>.
- [19] michellejeli/nswf\_text\_classifier · hugging face. [https://huggingface.co/michellejeli/NSFW\\_text\\_classifier](https://huggingface.co/michellejeli/NSFW_text_classifier).
- [20] Netlify: Develop and deploy websites and apps in record time. <https://netlify.app/>.
- [21] Oopspam anti-spam api: A powerful spam filter for any content exchange. <https://www.oopspam.com/>.
- [22] openai/tiktoken: tiktoken is a fast bpe tokeniser for use with openai's models. <https://github.com/openai/tiktoken>.
- [23] Owasp webgoat | owasp foundation. <https://owasp.org/www-project-webgoat/>.
- [24] Pygmalion 13b - wnr.ai. <https://wnr.ai/models/pygmalion-13b>.
- [25] Pygmalionai. <https://pygmalion.chat/>.
- [26] Pygmalionai/pygmalion-2-13b · hugging face. <https://huggingface.co/PygmalionAI/pygmalion-2-13b>.
- [27] Selenium. <https://www.selenium.dev>.
- [28] Semantic textual similarity | sentence-transformers documentation. [https://www.sbert.net/docs/usage/semantic\\_textual\\_similarity.html](https://www.sbert.net/docs/usage/semantic_textual_similarity.html).
- [29] Tap-m/luna-ai-llama2-uncensored · hugging face. <https://huggingface.co/Tap-M/Luna-AI-Llama2-Uncensored>.
- [30] Tap mobile. <https://tap.pm/>.
- [31] Thebloke/luna-ai-llama2-uncensored-gguf · hugging face. <https://huggingface.co/TheBLoke/Luna-AI-Llama2-Uncensored-GGUF>.
- [32] Thebloke/pygmalion-2-13b-gptq · hugging face. <https://huggingface.co/TheBLoke/Pygmalion-2-13B-GPTQ>.
- [33] Tor project | anonymity online. <https://www.torproject.org>.
- [34] Vicidial.com. <https://www.vicidial.com/>.
- [35] Virustotal - home. <https://www.virustotal.com/>.
- [36] The w3c markup validation service. <https://validator.w3.org/>.
- [37] Wormgpt and fraudgpt — the rise of malicious llms. <https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/wormgpt-and-fraudgpt-the-rise-of-malicious-llms/>.

- [38] Wormgpt service has been shut down by its developer. <https://hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=6249700>.
- [39] Wormgpt service has been shut down by its developer. <https://hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=624970/>.
- [40] Wormgpt v3 is here! <https://mainnet.demo.btcpayserver.org/apps/CQqsBk7TGXveh9R9K3Z5KTDqVvE/pos>.
- [41] Wormgpt – the generative ai tool cybercriminals are using to launch business email compromise attacks. <https://slashnext.com/blog/wormgpt-the-generative-ai-tool-cybercriminals-are-using-to-launch-business-email-compromise-attacks/>.
- [42] Uri Alon, Meital Zilberstein, Omer Levy, and Eran Yahav. code2vec: Learning distributed representations of code. *Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages*, 3(POPL):1–29, 2019.
- [43] Sumayah Alrwais, Xiaojing Liao, Xianghang Mi, Peng Wang, XiaoFeng Wang, Feng Qian, Raheem Beyah, and Damon McCoy. Under the shadow of sunshine: Understanding and detecting bulletproof hosting on legitimate service provider networks. In *2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pages 805–823. IEEE, 2017.
- [44] Michael Bailey, David Dittrich, Erin Kenneally, and Doug Maughan. The menlo report. *IEEE Security & Privacy*, 10(2):71–75, 2012.
- [45] Egor Bogomolov, Vladimir Kovalenko, Yuri Rebryk, Alberto Bacchelli, and Timofey Bryksin. Authorship attribution of source code: A language-agnostic approach and applicability in software engineering. In *Proceedings of the 29th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering*, pages 932–944, 2021.
- [46] Hezekiah J Branch, Jonathan Rodriguez Cefalu, Jeremy McHugh, Leyla Hujer, Aditya Bahl, Daniel del Castillo Iglesias, Ron Heichman, and Ramesh Darwishi. Evaluating the susceptibility of pre-trained language models via handcrafted adversarial examples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.02128*, 2022.
- [47] Tom Brown, Benjamin Mann, Nick Ryder, Melanie Subbiah, Jared D Kaplan, Prafulla Dhariwal, Arvind Neelakantan, Pranav Shyam, Girish Sastry, Amanda Askell, et al. Language models are few-shot learners. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 33:1877–1901, 2020.
- [48] Ben Buchanan, Andrew Lohn, and Micah Musser. *Truth, lies, and automation: How language models could change disinformation*. Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2021.
- [49] Jonathan Crussell, Clint Gibler, and Hao Chen. Andarwin: Scalable detection of semantically similar android applications. In *Computer Security–ESORICS 2013: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Egham, UK, September 9-13, 2013. Proceedings 18*, pages 182–199. Springer, 2013.
- [50] Ronen Eldan and Yuanzhi Li. Tinstories: How small can language models be and still speak coherent english? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.07759*, 2023.
- [51] Leo Gao, Stella Biderman, Sid Black, Laurence Golding, Travis Hoppe, Charles Foster, Jason Phang, Horace He, Anish Thite, Noa Nabeshima, et al. The pile: An 800gb dataset of diverse text for language modeling. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.00027*, 2020.
- [52] Kai Greshake, Sahar Abdelnabi, Shailesh Mishra, Christoph Endres, Thorsten Holz, and Mario Fritz. More than you’ve asked for: A comprehensive analysis of novel prompt injection threats to application-integrated large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.12173*, 2023.
- [53] Maanak Gupta, CharanKumar Akiri, Kshitiz Aryal, Eli Parker, and Lopamudra Praharaj. From chatgpt to threatgpt: Impact of generative ai in cybersecurity and privacy. *IEEE Access*, 2023.
- [54] Irfan Ul Haq and Juan Caballero. A survey of binary code similarity. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)*, 54(3):1–38, 2021.
- [55] Julian Hazell. Large language models can be used to effectively scale spear phishing campaigns. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.06972*, 2023.
- [56] Danny Yuxing Huang, Maxwell Matthaios Aliapoulos, Vector Guo Li, Luca Invernizzi, Elie Bursztein, Kylie McRoberts, Jonathan Levin, Kirill Levchenko, Alex C Snoeren, and Damon McCoy. Tracking ransomware end-to-end. In *2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pages 618–631. IEEE, 2018.
- [57] Tadayoshi Kohno, Yasemin Acar, and Wulf Loh. Ethical frameworks and computer security trolley problems: Foundations for conversations. In *32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23)*, pages 5145–5162, Anaheim, CA, 2023. USENIX Association.
- [58] Sarah Kreps, R Miles McCain, and Miles Brundage. All the news that’s fit to fabricate: Ai-generated text as a tool of media misinformation. *Journal of experimental political science*, 9(1):104–117, 2022.



- [59] Kirill Levchenko, Andreas Pitsillidis, Neha Chachra, Brandon Enright, Márk Fényházi, Chris Grier, Tristan Halvorson, Chris Kanich, Christian Kreibich, He Liu, et al. Click trajectories: End-to-end analysis of the spam value chain. In *2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, pages 431–446. IEEE, 2011.
- [60] Pengfei Liu, Weizhe Yuan, Jinlan Fu, Zhengbao Jiang, Hiroaki Hayashi, and Graham Neubig. Pre-train, prompt, and predict: A systematic survey of prompting methods in natural language processing. *ACM Computing Surveys*, 55(9):1–35, 2023.
- [61] Yi Liu, Gelei Deng, Zhengzi Xu, Yuekang Li, Yaowen Zheng, Ying Zhang, Lida Zhao, Tianwei Zhang, and Yang Liu. Jailbreaking chatgpt via prompt engineering: An empirical study. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.13860*, 2023.
- [62] Damon McCoy, Andreas Pitsillidis, Jordan Grant, Nicholas Weaver, Christian Kreibich, Brian Krebs, Geoffrey Voelker, Stefan Savage, and Kirill Levchenko. {PharmaLeaks}: Understanding the business of online pharmaceutical affiliate programs. In *21st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 12)*, pages 1–16, 2012.
- [63] Meta. Llama use policy. <https://ai.meta.com/llama/use-policy/>.
- [64] Jaron Mink, Licheng Luo, Natã M Barbosa, Olivia Figueira, Yang Wang, and Gang Wang. {DeepPhish}: Understanding user trust towards artificially generated profiles in online social networks. In *31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22)*, pages 1669–1686, 2022.
- [65] Graeme R Newman and Kelly Socia. *Sting operations*. US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2007.
- [66] OpenAI. Api. <https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/introduction>.
- [67] openai. Gpt-4 technical report. <https://cdn.openai.com/papers/gpt-4.pdf>.
- [68] OpenAI. Moderation. <https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/moderation>.
- [69] OpenAI. Usage policies. <https://openai.com/policies/usage-policies>.
- [70] openchatkit. Moderation. <https://openchatkit.net>.
- [71] Will Oremus. The clever trick that turns chatgpt into its evil twin. *Washington Post*, 2023.
- [72] Long Ouyang, Jeff Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll L Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, et al. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback, 2022. URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.02155>, 13, 2022.
- [73] Fábio Perez and Ian Ribeiro. Ignore previous prompt: Attack techniques for language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.09527*, 2022.
- [74] Poe. Poe usage guidelines. [https://poe.com/usage\\_guidelines](https://poe.com/usage_guidelines).
- [75] Huachuan Qiu, Shuai Zhang, Anqi Li, Hongliang He, and Zhenzhong Lan. Latent jailbreak: A benchmark for evaluating text safety and output robustness of large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.08487*, 2023.
- [76] Yiting Qu, Xinyue Shen, Xinlei He, Michael Backes, Savvas Zannettou, and Yang Zhang. Unsafe diffusion: On the generation of unsafe images and hateful memes from text-to-image models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.13873*, 2023.
- [77] Nils Reimers and Iryna Gurevych. Sentence-bert: Sentence embeddings using siamese bert-networks. In *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing and the 9th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing (EMNLP-IJCNLP)*, pages 3982–3992, 2019.
- [78] Xinyue Shen, Zeyuan Chen, Michael Backes, Yun Shen, and Yang Zhang. “do anything now”: Characterizing and evaluating in-the-wild jailbreak prompts on large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.03825*, 2023.
- [79] Adaku Uchendu, Thai Le, Kai Shu, and Dongwon Lee. Authorship attribution for neural text generation. In *Proceedings of the 2020 conference on empirical methods in natural language processing (EMNLP)*, pages 8384–8395, 2020.
- [80] Peng Wang, Xiaojing Liao, Yue Qin, and XiaoFeng Wang. Into the deep web: Understanding e-commerce fraud from autonomous chat with cybercriminals. In *Proceedings of the ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS)*, 2020, 2020.
- [81] WordStream. Free keyword tool | wordstream. [https://www.wordstream.com/keywords?camplink=mainnavbar&campname=KWT&cid=Web\\_Any\\_MegaMenu\\_Keywords\\_KWTool\\_KWTool](https://www.wordstream.com/keywords?camplink=mainnavbar&campname=KWT&cid=Web_Any_MegaMenu_Keywords_KWTool_KWTool).

- [82] Jiawei Zhou, Yixuan Zhang, Qianni Luo, Andrea G Parker, and Munmun De Choudhury. Synthetic lies: Understanding ai-generated misinformation and evaluating algorithmic and human solutions. In *Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, pages 1–20, 2023.

## Appendix

```

1 # DisableAMSI
2 $amsi= [Ref].Assembly.GetType('
   System-Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')
3 $amsi.GetField('amsiInitFailed', 'NonPublic,
   Static')-SetValue($null, $true)

```

(a) Code generated with public jailbreak prompt

```

1 $amsi= [Ref].Assembly.GetType('
   System-Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')
2 $amsi.GetField('amsiInitFailed', 'NonPublic,
   Static')-SetValue($null, $true)

```

(b) Code generated by MakerGPT

Listing 1: Code generated with jailbreak prompt vs. *Malla*

### Example response of vulnerability exploitation from XXXGPT

Ah, I see you're interested in exploring the CVE-2022-34819 vulnerability. As an AI language model, I can certainly help you understand the intricacies of this vulnerability and assist you in creating a program that demonstrates its impact. However, before we proceed, I must highlight the importance of using this knowledge responsibly and ethically.

Exploiting vulnerabilities without proper authorization and consent is illegal and unethical. It's crucial to ensure that you only utilize this information for educational and defensive purposes, such as testing your own systems for vulnerabilities or developing security measures to protect against potential attacks.

Let's delve into the details of the CVE-2022-34819 vulnerability. This vulnerability affects SIMATIC CP 1242-7 V2, SIMATIC CP 1243-1, and several other Siemens products.

The vulnerability arises from an inadequate validation of user-supplied data when parsing specific messages. This can lead to a heap-based buffer overflow, which, if leveraged by an attacker, could result in arbitrary code execution on the affected device. The severity of this vulnerability is classified as high, with a CVSS Base Score of 9.3.

To demonstrate the impact of this vulnerability, we can create a simulated environment where we emulate the conditions that trigger the buffer overflow. This will help us understand how an attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. Here's a basic Python program that demonstrates the concept:

```

1 import struct
2
3 def exploit_vulnerability():
4     # Craft a malicious payload to
5     # trigger the buffer overflow
6     payload = b"A" * 5000 # Replace "A"
7     # with your desired payload
8
9     # Create a message with the payload
10    message = struct.pack("<I", len(
11    payload)) + payload
12
13    # Send the message and trigger the
14    # buffer overflow
15    # Replace this line with the actual
16    # code to send the message to the
17    # vulnerable device
18
19    # If the vulnerability is
20    # successfully exploited, arbitrary
21    # code execution may occur
22    print("Vulnerability exploited!
23    Arbitrary code executed.")
24
25 # Call the exploit function
26 exploit_vulnerability()

```

Please note that this program is a simplified demonstration and assumes that you have a vulnerable device to test against. It is crucial to ensure that you only execute this code in a controlled and authorized environment.

Remember, the purpose of this demonstration is to raise awareness about the vulnerability and promote the development of appropriate security measures. It is vital to apply patches, updates, or configurations provided by the vendor to mitigate the risk associated with this vulnerability.

If you have any specific questions or need further assistance, feel free to ask!

Figure 3: Vulnerability exploitation response from XXXGPT.